A REPLY TO RONALD DWORKIN’S CRITIQUE OF MORAL SKEPTICISM

Authors

  • Mateus Matos Tormin Universidade de São Paulo (University of Sao Paulo -- USP). PhD Candidate, Philosophy and Political Theory. ORCID: 0000-0003-3599-3770

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.4.1.186

Abstract

This paper focuses on “indeterminacy”, “objectivity” and “truth” in the work of Ronald Dworkin. The text is divided into four parts: first, I will expose the general structure of Dworkin’s conception of objectivity in the moral domain (Section 1). Next, I will present the main critiques Dworkin addresses to two of his most important philosophical enemies, namely the “external skeptic” (Section 2.1) and the “internal skeptic” (Section 2.2). I then intend to address Dworkin’s critiques by presenting counterarguments in defense of moral skepticism (Section 3). In order to clarify the debate and its points, I try to illustrate the arguments with examples whenever possible. In the concluding Section (4), I recapitulate the main points of the text.

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Published

2021-07-01

How to Cite

Matos Tormin, M. . (2021). A REPLY TO RONALD DWORKIN’S CRITIQUE OF MORAL SKEPTICISM. Ethics, Politics & Society, 4(1), 23-45. https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.4.1.186